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INTRODUCTION

The Israel-Palestine war, its origins based on territorial conflicts, nationalism, and historical grievances, has been around for more than seven decades, from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War to current hostilities in Gaza and the West Bank. The conflict reached a higher intensity after Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, in which more than 1,200 were killed and more than 250 hostages were taken, leading to Israel's military campaign "Swords of Iron." This, as of August 2025, has led to more than 40,000 Palestinian fatalities, large-scale devastation in Gaza, and an increasing humanitarian crisis. The asymmetry of the conflict—between a technologically sophisticated state and non-state armed formations—makes it difficult to apply International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the law that regulates armed conflicts.

IHL, mainly codified in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, seeks to safeguard non-combatants, provide humane treatment, and restrict the means and methods of warfare. It differentiates between international armed conflicts (IACs) fought between states and non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) fought among non-state groups. In the Israel-Palestine environment, the conflict is doubly classified: as an IAC between Israel and the State of Palestine (both recognized by more than 140 states) and as a NIAC between Israel and non-state actors such as Hamas. This double classification stems from the fact that Israel has occupied Palestinian land since 1967, and this occupation continues even after the 2005 Gaza disengagement, as Israel holds de facto control over borders, airspace, and critical services.

Fundamental IHL principles are distinction (attacking exclusively military targets), proportionality (preventing civilian injury from

outweighing military gain), and precautions in attack. But it is under acute challenges in implementation. Israel's extended occupation breaches occupation law by annexing territories such as East Jerusalem and constructing settlements, prohibitions stated in Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Palestinian armed groups violate humanitarian law through indiscriminate rocket fire and taking hostages. Enforcement is inhibited by IHL's absence of centralized mechanisms, depending on state cooperation, international pressure, and institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), which Israel does not acknowledge.

Politically, the polarization of the conflict worsens challenges. Israel rationalizes actions as self-defense, but Palestinians perceive them as apartheid and collective punishment. UN reports capture war crimes by both parties, with Israel's blockade as a cause of starvation and Palestinian factions' torture. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has declared Israel's occupation illegal, but compliance is elusive.

This paper's argument is that difficulties in IHL implementation are rooted in structural asymmetries, poor enforcement, habitual violations, and differing views, imperiling the survival of IHL. From an examination of primary sources of UN, ICRC, and NGOs, it attempts to achieve a balanced perspective, giving precedence to evidence over prejudice. The reasoning goes through the legal framework, issues of enforcement, particular violations, views, implications, and suggestions.

LEGAL STRUCTURE AND CATEGORIZATION OF THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT

The body of law that covers the Israel-Palestine conflict in the context of international humanitarian law (IHL) is complex, relying mainly on the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols, which codify regulations to alleviate the effects of armed conflict on civilians and combatants. These treaties, combined with customary international law as determined by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), are the foundation for categorizing and governing the hostilities. The classification of the conflict is of particular complexity, being of hybrid nature, with features of both international armed conflicts (IACs) and non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) overlapping the long-standing reality of belligerent occupation. This dual nature is the result of history: Israeli occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip after the 1967 Six-Day War, continuing with mitigating withdrawals, like the 2005 disengagement from Gaza. International consensus, as expressed in UN resolutions and ICJ

opinions, treats Palestine as a state for IHL purposes—recognized by more than 140 states and having acceded to significant treaties such as the Geneva Conventions—making interstate hostilities qualify as an IAC. At the same time, interactions with non-state militaries such as Hamas, which govern Gaza but are not state organs, invoke NIAC norms under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II. This parallel categorization has far-reaching implications: in IACs, full protections are in place, including bans on starvation as a weapon of war (Additional Protocol I, Article 54), whereas NIACs provide lesser safeguards centered on treatment in a humane manner and ban on violence to life and person.

The test for an IAC is fulfilled if armed conflict between two or more states exists, as determined in Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions. Palestine's statehood, guaranteed by its 2012 UN General Assembly observer status elevation and accession to treaties, makes this characterization possible, especially in the context of occupation. Occupation law, as it is under the jurisdiction of the 1907 Hague Regulations (Articles 42-56) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (Articles 47-78), comes into play when a territory is brought within the control of an enemy force, even without ongoing resistance. For Gaza, in spite of Israel's withdrawal in 2005 of settlers and ground troops, a de facto control remains through the control of borders, airspace, territorial waters, and vital services such as electricity and water supply, making military re-entry possible at whim—as in operations after October 2023. The ICRC, UN, and ICJ repeatedly uphold this occupation status, denying Israel's contention that disengagement concluded it. Occupation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is unambiguously present, Israel's annexation of the East Jerusalem being in breach of the prohibition against gaining territory by military means (UN Security Council Resolution 242). The ICJ advisory opinion in July 2024 on the legality of Israeli policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) pronounced the occupation unlawful because it is permanent and violates such as expansion of settlements, which violate Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention by transferring civilians into occupied territory. As of 2025, settlements accommodate more than 700,000 Israelis in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, extracting resources and changing demographics, practices that constitute war crimes according to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

For NIAC classification, Common Article 3 criteria mandate organized armed groups to be involved in protracted violence of sufficient intensity. Hamas and Palestinian factions fulfill this, with the rocket attacks and October 7, 2023, incursion being the

prime examples of NIAC dynamics. Yet, in December 2024, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber upheld concurrent classifications: IAC for Israel's hostilities against Palestine as a state and NIAC for direct conflicts with Hamas. This mixed model guarantees wider protections; for example, starvation strategies within Gaza are war crimes under IAC rules alone. Specialist Marco Sassòli, in his writings, emphasizes this complexity, stating that if Hamas cannot be attributed to Palestine, the war with it is still NIAC, but occupation superimposes IAC obligations. Sassòli advocates for pragmatic IHL application in asymmetries, when non-state entities such as Hamas are held to capacity-based expectations but are required to comply with rules prohibiting indiscriminate attacks (Customary IHL Rule 11). Israel's refusal of *de jure* Geneva Convention application in the OPT, on the grounds that the territories are not sovereign (subject to Jordanian and Egyptian administration) prior to 1967, is universally excluded; Israel *de facto* but discriminatorily applies humanitarian provisions, resulting in enforcement gaps.

Fundamental IHL principles—distinction (striking only military targets, Additional Protocol I Article 48), proportionality (harm to civilians not disproportionate to the military gain, Article 51(5)(b)), and precautions (efforts to avoid harm that are feasible, Article 57)—prohibit universally through custom. In Gaza's common urban warfare, they are pushed to the limits: using civilian infrastructure as shields by Hamas infringes distinction (Rule 97), yet does not release Israel from obligations. The Gaza blockade, heightened since 2023, is a collective punishment issue (Fourth Geneva Convention Article 33), with 2025 UN reports showing famine and illness from restricted assistance. Human rights law (IHRL) operates in parallel in occupations, according to ICJ decisions (e.g., 2004 Wall advisory opinion), complementing IHL on gaps such as arbitrary detention; Israel objects to extraterritorial IHRL obligations, but Sassòli offers holistic interpretations, proposing six conceivable IHL-IHRL interactions, preferring the more favorable norm.

Enforcement mechanisms are decentralized: states must ensure respect (Common Article 1), and ICC prosecute war crimes from 2015 onwards following Palestine's accession to the Rome Statute. 2024 ICC warrants issued to Israeli leaders (e.g., Netanyahu for starvation) and Hamas leaders point to accountability, but Israeli non-cooperation continues. The UN Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts (RULAC) project categorizes the situation as IAC under occupation with concurrent NIACs, highlighting third-state obligations to suspend violations such as arms transfers. Contemporary 2025 events, such as intensified West Bank raids and Gaza displacements (more than 5,800 fatalities by June according to ICJ reports), highlight forcible transfer bans (Article

49). Israel's 2025 law on administrative detention for "affiliates of hostilities" obfuscates IHL-IHRL boundaries, possibly breaching due process.

VIOLATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS IN THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT

The conflict in Israel-Palestine remains the quintessential example of deep-seated difficulties with the compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL), with particular breaches by each side enervating the system's foundational principles of distinction, proportionality, precautions in attack, and the ban on collective punishment. These violations, well-documented by international organizations like the United Nations (UN), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and Amnesty International, have escalated since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, that claimed about 1,200 lives and included taking hostages—a flagrant disregard of IHL's safeguards for civilians under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. In response, Israel's Gaza campaign, continuing into 2025 after a short January ceasefire, has claimed more than 44,000 Palestinian lives, caused widespread devastation, and created a humanitarian crisis where famine, disease, and displacement have hit nearly 2 million people.

The Palestinian militant groups, such as Hamas, conducted indiscriminate attacks, launching hundreds of rockets and mortars at Israeli civilian locations, violating the conventional IHL norm against attacking civilians (Rule 1 of the ICRC's Customary IHL Study) and constituting war crimes under the Rome Statute. Violations on the Israeli side include the employment of U.S.-provided munitions against schools used as shelters, e.g., August 2025's hundreds-killing attack, considered "illegally and indiscriminately" by observers, breaching distinction and proportionality under Articles 48 and 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I. The blockade of Gaza, limiting aid and necessities, has been termed as employing starvation as a weapon of war—a war crime in international armed conflicts (IACs) according to Article 54 of Additional Protocol I—and collective punishment under Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Through mid-2025, this has resulted in more than 727,000 instances of waterborne disease due to intentional water infrastructure destruction, likely amounting to acts of extermination or genocide according to HRW and UN reports. In the West Bank, settler violence—supported by Israeli forces—has displaced communities through assault and land confiscation, contravening occupation law's obligation to preserve public order (Article 43 of the Hague Regulations). The UN 2025 report on children and armed conflict confirmed 8,554

serious violations against 2,959 children, including deaths and wounding by Israeli security forces and recruitment by Palestinian factions, highlighting violations of protection under Additional Protocol I Article 77.

The School, monastery, and cultural facility bombing in Gaza—destruction of more than 400 schools and half of heritage sites—portend senseless destruction without military need, an Article 53 war crime of Additional Protocol I. Evacuation orders and infrastructure demolition constituting forced displacement have been ruled criminal forcible transfer under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, with the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) urging its cessation in June 2025. Problems with implementation are compounded by the conflict's hybrid status as both IAC (because of occupation) and non-international armed conflict (NIAC) with actors like Hamas, resulting in inconsistent application of rules; for instance, starvation is only criminalized expressly in IACs. Enforcement loopholes result from IHL's de-centred character, based on state self-regulation and global pressure, but Israel's refusal of occupation status in Gaza after 2005 disengagement—when it de facto controls borders and airspace—permits avoidance of responsibilities such as supplying necessities (Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). The imbalances, commenting that non-state actors have realistic expectations according to capacity, but states such as Israel are required to live up to higher standards of proportionality judgments in urban warfare¹.

In his 2017 expert view of occupier's legislative powers, Sassòli criticizes Israel's Jordanian planning law amendments through Military Order 418 (1971), which surpass Article 43 boundaries by favouring settlers over Palestinians, resulting in "planning failure" and instances such as settlements as "uncontroversial" violations of Article 49(6). He maintains that they constitute de facto changes barred under the law of occupation, which promote demographic change and exploitation, including abusive usage of Ottoman and Jordanian land laws to legally designate "state land" for settlements. Sassòli's 2002 paper on state responsibility highlights attribution of breaches to states for acts of armed forces, even where unauthorized, and third states' obligations under Common Article 1 to "ensure respect," including not assisting breaches—material to U.S. arms transfers in the context of 2025 reporting of Israeli war crimes.

He identifies serious violations of peremptory norms (*jus cogens*), such as banning annexation, invoking non-recognition duties on

¹ Marco Sassòli, in *International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare* (2019, revised 2024).

third states, and imposed on Israel's settlement project according to the ICJ's July 2024 advisory opinion finding the occupation illegal. In evaluating Gaza hostilities (2023 Lieber article), Sassòli refers to challenges in establishing proof of proportionality violations because of a lack of transparency in decision-making for targets, suggesting measures such as mandatory disclosure of military plans ex post to improve credibility and limit "lawfare" by spurious allegations. He promotes local investigations of incidents with significant civilian casualties, according to ICRC policy, to learn from and avoid repetition, citing Israel's Turkel Commission as an example but decrying insufficient follow-through.

More extensive implementation challenges are political pressures, with the UN Security Council's May 2025 projection observing "widespread impunity" as a promoter of abuses, and the Secretary-General's report on more than 120 conflicts citing lenient IHL interpretations. Israel's targeting of sanitation infrastructure and access limitations in Gaza's water crisis violate IHL requirements on essentials, arguably war crimes, according to Geneva Academy 2025 spot report. Sassòli's 2024 highlight double standards undermining IHL, requiring balanced enforcement for its neutrality². Counterarguments raise Israel's self-defense justifications under UN Charter Article 51, but IHL constrains reactions, with violations not justified by necessity. Palestinian frames violate in terms of apartheid, according to Amnesty, whereas Israeli frames pose threats from armed factions.

To fulfill implementation, Sassòli proposes bringing human rights law (IHRL) to fill gaps, as in his book chapter on IHL-IHRL interaction, with preferential protective norms in occupations. International investigations might assess national investigations but face access barriers³. The 2025 collapse of the ceasefire highlights recurrence, with 28 states calling for cessation of violations after ICJ opinion. Finally, they undermine the effectiveness of IHL, necessitating strong accountability to dismantle cycles of violence.

ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN BASES OF VIEWS IN THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict brings forth diametrically opposite visions from Israeli and Palestinian parties regarding the application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) based on entrenched discourses of security, occupation, and resistance. These are informed by historical grievances, power asymmetry,

² Marco Sassoli "International Humanitarian Law" Book , Page No. 15

³ Ibid

and political ideologies and usually result in allegations of bias in international application. Israeli visions tend to focus on self-defense against existential threats, whereas Palestinian visions focus on systemic oppression and abuses under extended occupation. Balanced reports by scholars and institutions point toward a mutual non-compliance, stressing the necessity of third-party impartiality to ensure civilian harm is minimized. This survey examines these viewpoints at length based on official comments, academic critiques, and reports through August 2025.

For the Israeli perspective, challenges to IHL originate largely in the asymmetry of the conflict, in which a state is confronted by non-state forces such as Hamas that integrate military activity into civilian spaces. Israeli leaders, such as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, contend that activity in Gaza is in accordance with IHL, highlighting precautions such as evacuation notices and targeted attacks to limit damage. They contend that excessive civilian casualties are the outcome of Hamas's employment of human shields as a breach of IHL's principle of distinction and not of Israeli intent. The Israeli government refuses continuous occupation of Gaza following disengagement in 2005, with no effective control and consequently no extraterritorial human rights obligations, its position being refused by the ICJ's 2024 advisory opinion. West Bank settlements are justified on grounds of security, but Israeli academic critiques point out dangers of transgressing proportionality and distinction. As an example, a letter from distinguished Israeli experts in international law in 2023-2025 denounced the government's statements of threatening "total destruction" of Gaza as violating IHL's ban on intimidation and collective punishment. They called for restraint, pointing out that compelled evacuations have to be temporary and for civilian security, not political objectives, and condemned "humanitarian city" plans as potential forced transfers.

This domestic opposition indicates devotion to IHL among Israeli scholars, who issue a warning that breaches could make Israel internationally isolated. Israeli counterarguments typically refer to Palestinian militant groups' indiscriminate rocket fire and hostage-taking as main IHL violations, warranting strong responses under UN Charter Article 51's right of self-defense. Judicial examinations, for instance, in Judicature, observe that whereas Israel is obligated by full Geneva Conventions as a state, Hamas has scaled obligations based on capacity limitations, making relative accountability difficult.

Palestinian voices, on the other hand, interpret Israeli measures as intentional IHL breaches under a pattern of apartheid and occupation aimed at sustaining collective punishment and

thwarting self-determination. The Palestinian Authority (PA) and human rights groups charge Israel with war crimes such as indiscriminate assault of civilians, targeting schools and cultural institutions, and employing starvation as a weapon of war through siege. Amnesty International's 2024 report concluded Israel had perpetrated genocide in Gaza, using the practice of killings, injury, and conditions resulting in physical destruction, in addition to existing concurrent military purposes. UN specialists in 2024 characterized Israel's campaign as attacking IHL pillars, with crimes such as murder, torture, and forced transfers constituting genocide. Hamas and others couch their activities as necessary resistance to occupation, while international audiences denounce indiscriminate rockets and October 7 atrocity as war crimes. Palestinians emphasize impunity, with the PA backing ICC investigations since 2015, seeing settlements and blockades as violating Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Palestinian counterarguments recognize armed groups' abuses but cite desperation under siege as the reason, calling for attention to underlying causes such as occupation.

RECENT TRENDS IN 2025 AND IMPLICATIONS

The ongoing and intensifying Israel-Palestine conflict, characterized by unstable ceasefires, resumed military attacks, and worsening humanitarian crises that drastically undermine the application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). After the temporary truce that was put into action in January of 2025, brokered under global pressure and including the release of prisoners and hostages, fighting resumed in dramatic fashion in March when Israel initiated Operation Swords of Iron II, a massive military operation to strike Gaza City, Khan Yunis, and Rafah, purportedly to destroy any remaining Hamas infrastructure. This renewal dashed expectations for de-escalation, and over 10,000 further Palestinian fatalities by the middle of the year, with UN accounts recording at least 54,607 deaths and 125,341 injured as of June, the majority civilians including a disproportionate number of children and women. The assault included widespread aerial bombing and ground invasions, intensifying the demolition of civilian infrastructure, with more than 90% of Gaza's housing damaged or demolished, compelling repeated mass displacements of nearly 2 million individuals. In the West Bank, violence escalated with over 1,000 settler attacks on Palestinian civilians documented since January, frequently with the complicity of Israeli security forces, leading to forced displacement and land confiscation contrary to occupation law under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Amnesty International's 2025 report charged Israel with genocide in Gaza by deliberate causation of conditions resulting in physical destruction, such as blocking aid

and destroying life-sustaining infrastructure, as well as continuing apartheid through forced transfers within the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). These events reflect a trend of persistent IHL infringements, where distinction and proportionality principles are regularly distorted, facilitating an impunity culture that undermines universal humanitarian standards.

Alongside Gaza's unrest, the West Bank's crisis escalated as Israel authorized more than 20,000 new settlement homes since 2023, picking up pace in 2025 with enlargement in East Jerusalem and strategic locations such as the Jordan Valley, moves that have been declared illegal by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its July 2024 advisory opinion, reaffirmed in UN meetings during the year. UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned in July 2025 that the conflict was at a "breaking point," pointing to the threat of one-state reality beyond reversal through de facto annexation, as settler violence pushed thousands out and militarized raids killed hundreds in raids such as the massive January operation in the northern West Bank. The April and July UN Security Council quarterly debates highlighted the growing settler violence, affecting more than 230 communities, and demanded action to implement the Fourth Geneva Convention, although the scheduled Conference of High Contracting Parties was postponed in March because of disagreement, a decision that was denounced for leading to complacency towards IHL abuses. Human Rights Watch World Report 2025 reported how such settlements were draining resources, such as water, from Palestinians at their expense, violating Article 55 responsibilities to deliver essentials, while thousands of arbitrary detentions rose, with records of torture and ill-treatment in Israeli centers rising to the level of war crimes under the Rome Statute. The consequences are significant: such enlargements extend occupation and normalize abuses, undermining the provisional nature entailed by IHL and sabotaging peace efforts by consolidating demographic change.

Regional considerations in 2025 also made IHL compliance more challenging, with the June war between Israel and Iran indirectly undermining Palestinian positions by interrupting aid from long-time backers, resulting in increased isolation and exposure in Gaza. Escalations with Hezbollah in Lebanon, climaxing in a November ceasefire after fierce clashes, resulted in further civilian deaths and displacements, confusing conflict lines and causing fear of cross-border IHL abuses such as indiscriminate shelling. In Gaza, the human disaster worsened with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) indicating 16,500 pregnant and lactating women severely malnourished, and more than 727,000 instances of waterborne diseases due to ruined

sanitation systems, measures Amnesty called intentional extermination strategy. Israel's Operation May in Rafah, in defiance of ICJ directives, uprooted 1.2 million, the majority already internally displaced, and destroyed the Rafah crossing, severely limiting aid and amounting to collective punishment under Article 33. The June report of the UN Human Rights Council on 2023-2024 abuses continued into 2025 patterns, determining both sides had committed war crimes but focusing on Israel's disproportional responses and inability to differentiate civilians, with more than 34,800 dead by May, 60% women and children. Implications are the normalization of starvation as war, a war crime in IACs, undermining IHL's credibility and creating precedents for other wars such as Ukraine or Sudan, where third-state responsibility under Common Article 1 is also disregarded.

Accountability measures were set back in 2025, with the ICC's 2024 warrants for Israeli political leaders Netanyahu and Gallant, and Hamas political leader Deif, challenged but confirmed in November 2024, but enforcement suspended amidst U.S. threats and lack of cooperation from Israel. Cancelling the March Conference underscored divisions, as Switzerland referred to deep differences, a possible indicator of diminishing political will to enforce IHL over long-term occupations. UN officials in December 2024 condemned Israel's attack on the foundations of IHL, a feeling shared in 2025 discussions, where 28 nations in July called for a halt to the war. Local investigations in Israel were still lacking, with nothing about West Bank murders despite 487 occurrences reported in 2024 raids that carried over into 2025. Consequences are severe: impunity leads to repetition, such as in settler violence driving communities out with little consequence, eroding faith in international law and fueling cycles of violence that overflow regionally. Norm degradation imperils worldwide precedent, wherein states disregard *erga omnes* obligations, depowering the universality of the Geneva Conventions.

Humanitarian access continued blocked, Israel's obstructions inducing famine impacting 90% of Gazans, contrary to prohibitions on the use of starvation as a weapon of warfare. Bombardment of humanitarian convoys, such as the World Central Kitchen incident aftermath in 2025 inquiries, identified threats to protected persons pursuant to Article 71. The UN 2025 children in armed conflict report confirmed 8,554 serious violations against 2,959 children, including recruitment by Palestinian forces and Israeli forces' killings. Educational and cultural targets were affected, with 403 schools targeted in Gaza, representing wanton destruction. Consequences reach beyond to long-term damage to society, with 15,613 children who were murdered undermining generations to come and violating Article

77 safeguards, while third state arms shipments in the face of violations violate Common Article 1 obligations. Such complicity habituates violations at the expense of IHL survival in asymmetric wars.

Wider implications cover the role of conflict in regional instability, with 2025 Gaza surveys showing views of irrevocable devastation, potentially radicalizing populations and extending hostilities. ICJ orders to prevent genocide and terminations of occupation ignored give expression to enforcement shortfalls, with Israel continuing operations in violation of rulings. Politically, non-holding of enforcement conferences marks retreat from multilateralism, implicating world powers in selective IHL application. To Palestinians, consequences are in diluted self-determination, with policies of an apartheid nature promoting discrimination; to Israelis, perpetually facing threats from armed factions makes militarization understandable but through the price of global isolation. Eventually, 2025 events foreshadow the marginalization of IHL, calling for reforms such as increased ICC activities and third-state sanctions to regain effectiveness and avert erosion of norms globally.